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Wendy K. Mariner†

INTRODUCTION
In 1894, John Drinkwater, the befuddled, searching architect in John
Crowley’s compelling fantasy, Little, Big, built his own home, Edgewood, “as a
kind of compound illustration” of Victorian architectural styles.1 Rounding
each corner, the visitor sees a different façade and interior – Italianate villa,
Tudor manor house, neo-classical, country cottage – complete in itself, its
attachment to the others invisible from a single perspective.
Reading a small flurry of articles from the past few years attempting to
describe the field of health law,2 one feels like a visitor to Edgewood. The
different perspectives are pleasing in themselves, without necessarily
revealing the whole. This essay examines what I call the “architecture” of the
health law field. By this I mean, without pressing the metaphor too far, the
framework of beams and studs in which interior spaces can be designed,
furnished and accessorized in different ways.
This essay addresses three primary questions. First, what is an academic
field of law? Second, is health law such a field? Lastly, if it is, how can or
should it be portrayed? The first question may have no answer. There are no
hard and fast rules for constituting an academic field of law, as explained
below in Part IV. Scholars, like practicing lawyers, fashion their own spheres
of expertise in response to practical need. This means that health law can
†

Professor of Health Law, Bioethics & Human Rights, Boston University School of
Public Health; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Professor of Socio-Medical
Sciences and Community Medicine, Boston University School of Medicine; Co-Director,
Regulatory Knowledge and Research Ethics, BU-BRIDGE Clinical and Translational Science
Institute, Boston University. My thanks to Fran Miller, George Annas, and William Sage for
encouragement and suggestions in preparing this essay.
1
John Crowley, Little, Big 32 (Harper Perennial ed. 2006).
2
See generally George J. Annas, Health Law at the Turn of the Century: From White
Dwarf to Red Giant, 21 Conn. L. Rev. 551 (1989) [hereinafter White Dwarf]; M. Gregg Bloche,
The Invention of Health Law, 91 Calif. L. Rev. 247 (2003); Henry T. Greeley, Some Thoughts
on Academic Health Law, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 391 (2006); Mark A. Hall, The History and
Future of Health Law: An Essentialist View, 41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 347 (2006) [hereinafter
Essentialist View]; Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 Health Matrix 155
(2004); S. Sandy Sandbar et al., Legal Medicine and Health Law Education, in Legal
Medicine 3 (S. Sandy Sandbar et al. eds., 7th ed. 2007); Walter Wadlington, Some Reflections
on Teaching Law and Medicine in Law School Since the ‘60s, 14 Health Matrix 231 (2004).
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qualify as a distinct field of law for several different reasons, summarized in
Part V. Therefore, I begin with the third question. After describing the
challenges of doing so, I suggest a conceptual framework for describing the
field. It is not a theory, nor a set of normative standards, but a description –
an architecture, if you will. The framework offers a blueprint for identifying
the principles worthy of consideration in identifying and analyzing legal issues
affecting health, while also allowing room for debating the normative values
that might govern particular sub-specialities or doctrines.
I.

DESCRIBING HEALTH LAW: THE CHALLENGES

Viewing the health law field as a whole, and as separate from other fields
of law, encounters two major challenges: (1) the range of legal issues the field
covers; and (2) the fact that many doctrines formerly unique to medicine have
given way to more general principles from other legal domains.
The first challenge is surely the sheer breadth of doctrines that potentially
apply to health issues. These include aspects of administrative, antitrust,
constitutional, contract, corporate, criminal, environmental, food and drug,
intellectual property, insurance, international, labor/employment, property,
taxation, and tort law. At first, it may seem impossible to master all the law
that could be relevant to health issues. Judge Frank Easterbrook’s concern
about dilettantism has some bite here.3 Lawyers who know too little about the
fields they try to join together – especially non-legal fields – risk errors of fact
or judgment. The concern is that familiarity with only small segments of
another field can deteriorate into doctrinal dabbling, distorting more general
principles. But this may say less about the legitimacy of the health law field
than the degree of difficulty in mastering it. One cannot profess expertise in
health law without a solid grounding in the principles that are brought to bear
on health issues, and their underlying rationales.
A possible response to the breadth problem is the practice of subspecialization, whereby scholars and practicing lawyers become familiar with
the scope of the field, but develop expertise in a particular area. This is already
common practice not only in health law, but also in other more traditional
legal domains, such as constitutional law, where experts on the First
Amendment may profess little knowledge of the negative commerce clause.
Thus, the breadth problem is not necessarily an impediment to classification
as an independent field of law.
The second challenge in describing the boundaries of health law is that
the doctrines and principles grounded in other legal domains have come to
apply to health problems with less and less special adaptation to the particular
circumstances of the medical profession or the physician-patient
relationship.4 Doctrines look less like unique rules for health than relatively
straightforward applications of principles of contract, tort, administrative law,
3
Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi. Legal F.
207, 207-08 (1996) (mocking “law and . . .” courses dedicated to a particular subject matter as
dilettantism, analogous to “Law of the Horse.”).
4
See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback: Reflections
on the Organization of Law, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 71, 76 (2008) (arguing that “a new field of legal
study is justified when a discrete factual setting generates the need for distinctive legal
solutions.”).
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or insurance, for example. This dilution of special rules followed health law’s
transformation from a narrow field of medical jurisprudence to the broader
field encompassing professional, financial and civic relationships among
patients, government, health providers, and financing institutions. The most
obvious example is the doctrine of informed consent, which applies principles
of autonomy and self-determination to decisions about medical treatment and
recognizes that physicians have no special prerogative to make these decisions
for their patients.5 George Annas and other health law scholars have
advocated for patients’ rights to make their own decisions about medical care,
to be treated with dignity and in privacy in hospitals, and to have access to
medical records of their treatment, among other rights individuals enjoy
outside medical facilities.6
Judicial and statutory recognition of patient rights was not only a victory
for patients’ rights advocates, but also a response to changes in the science
and practice of medicine.7 Other sets of rules once thought foreign to the
medical profession, such as antitrust law, began to govern physicians and
health care organizations in more or less the same manner that they applied
to commercial businesses.8 Tort, contract and insurance principles are also
increasingly brought to bear on health-related relationships with little
alteration from their commercial origins.9 To be sure, many of these principles
and doctrines are modified somewhat to suit the particular circumstances of
health problems.10 Nonetheless, what is striking about health law doctrines
today is how much less they diverge from the standards imported directly
from other legal domains than they did a half-century ago.
Paradoxically, as health law gained acceptance as a distinct specialty, the
legal principles governing much of its subject matter loosened their parochial
ties to medicine as the rationale for singular rules. The convergence of
principles and doctrines as applied in the health law field with the principles
and doctrines as applied in their fields of origin poses a dilemma for defining
the boundaries of health law. On one hand, this convergence can be seen as
welcome recognition of particular needs of patients, professionals or
organizations in the health field. On the other hand, to the extent that
principles are not distinctive, there may be less justification for claiming a
unique field of health law.
5
Jay Katz, The Silent World of Doctor and Patient (1984). See generally Ruth
R. Faden et al., A History and Theory of Informed Consent (1986).
6
See generally George J. Annas, The Rights of Patients (3d ed. 2004).
7
Wendy K. Mariner, Informed Consent in the Post-Modern Era, 13 L. & Soc. Inquiry
385, 393 (1988).
8
See generally Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co., Inc., 440 U.S.
205 (1979) (applying Sherman Act to Blue Cross); Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v.
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (applying Sherman Act to insurer). See also, Utah County v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985) (revoking hospital’s state tax
exemption).
9
See generally Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (liability for health
insurance coverage denials under ERISA and state common law); American Manufacturers
Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (1999) (insurers handling state worker
compensation programs are not state actors for purposes of the 14th Amendment); Darling v.
Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 33 Ill.2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965), cert. denied,
383 U.S. 946 (1966) (applying corporate liability for negligence to hospital).
10
See generally Alberts v. Devine, 395 Mass. 59 (1985) (physician’s duty of
confidentiality).
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II. DESCRIBING THE ARCHITECTURE OF HEALTH LAW
Despite these challenges, the persistence and growth of health law as a de
facto legal specialty still argues for its acceptance as a field of law. This is not
to say that health law unequivocally meets the definition of a field of law;
rather, as I describe in Part IV, there is no authoritative definition that must
be met. Health law qualifies because people practice it, and there is little to
gain by academic debates over whether what they do is a field or not.
Furthermore, as I argue in Part V, the absence of an overarching theory of
health law is no impediment to becoming a field of law.
Nevertheless, if health law is a field, one should know what it includes.
Ideally, health law should be described in a manner that gathers all the
disparate legal doctrines into a comprehensible whole with observable
commonalities, but without necessarily forcing it to adopt any normative goal.
This requires accepting the applied nature of the field. The subject matter to
which the law applies retains its singular importance. The reason we struggle
with definitions is that what brings the different legal domains into play is the
subject matter – health. As the Task Force on Health Law Curricula noted, “a
description of health law cannot be viewed as merely the sum of its
component bodies of law . . . . The content of health law emerges only in the
application of these various bodies of law to the domain of the health
professions.”11 Today, I would replace “the domain of the health professions”
with “social structures that affect health.”
Health is the subject of law, but it is not the goal of law. Most
fundamentally, health law adopts and adapts principles from other legal
domains to protect the value of health within a framework of justice and the
rule of law. Thus, it is not simply the rote application of contract doctrine to
an agreement between entities that happen to be in the health field, but an
interpretation of whether and how that doctrine ought to be modified both to
achieve the goal of contract law and to recognize the value of health. In this
very broad sense, health law has dual normative goals: justice and protection
of health.
The sense in which I use the concept of goals here is not to impose a
requirement that the law must achieve specific normative ends. Rather, it
recognizes that justice or the rule of law has its own goals and values.12 In one
sense, most applied fields have dual goals. The difference between health law
and “law and the horse” is that the latter need not ascribe any particular value
to the horse, whereas health law does value health, but not as a sole end in
itself. This type of goal works best, and perhaps only works where it expresses
a very broad and highly abstract value, like keeping promises or protecting
health. Imposed on more granular circumstances, a value becomes outcome
determinative and often counterproductive.13 A value-driven legal structure
11
Am. Soc’y Law and Med., Health Law and Professional Education: The Report of the
Task Force on Health Law Curricula of the American Society of Law and Medicine, 63 Det. L.
Rev. 245, 254-55 (1985) [hereinafter Task Force].
12
See generally Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in Liberty and the Rule
of Law 3 (1979); Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory
(2004); The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology? (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick J. Monahan,
eds., 1987).
13
See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, Law as a Means to an End: Threat to the
Rule of Law (2006).
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would convert a description of a field into a normative prescription for
particular outcomes. If we knew what outcomes we wanted, why worry about
the values of law? Laws would become merely a tool for achieving other ends.
Just as not every contract need uphold the value of keeping promises, not
every law need value health over other goods. For this reason, health law, like
other applied fields, recognizes the importance of weighing the goals of law or
justice equally with the value of protecting health.
The value of health is an essential consideration, but not necessarily
controlling in any particular setting or circumstance. Lawyers need to think
carefully about when a legal principle is controlling and when the health
concern is controlling. It is one thing to contextualize the application of legal
principles in specific circumstances.14 It is quite another to subordinate
general legal principles to the possibly self-interested goals of a particular
industry or profession, no matter how congenial. This in no way precludes
adapting principles to account for special obligations owed by physicians to
patients by reason of a person’s status as a patient and the physician’s status
as physician, for example. But that informs doctrinal development. It should
not impose an overarching goal for law itself, not even in the health law field.
At the same time, it is not enough to apply existing bodies of law to health
issues. The very attempt at application challenges the meaning of the
principles being applied.15 Recognizing the consequences of legal principles in
the health context yields important insights into how we think about the
relationship between individuals and government, as well as individual and
social responsibility for health risks.16 Health law analyses are transforming
the way we think about the body, personal information, and property.17 The
interpretation of some laws related to health can affect the distribution of
wealth and the allocation of resources. The application of health law
principles has blurred the lines between medicine and public health, disease
and health, and what it means to be a citizen, a consumer and a patient.18
These and countless other applications reveal the importance of both law and
health and the iterative process of interpreting their mutual influence.
International law has already developed a conceptual framework for an
architecture of the health law field in terms that recognize both the value of
justice and the value of health. Looking at international conceptions of a field
has the advantage of permitting comparative analysis of particular problems
14

See generally Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on
Life and Law (1987); Brian Tamanaha, Realistic Socio-Legal Theory: Pragmatism and
a Social Theory of Law (Oxford 1997); Mary L. Dudziak, Freedom is Not Enough: The
Opening Up of the American Workplace (2006).
15
See, e.g., Adam Wagstaff, Social Health Insurance Reexamined 20 (World Bank
Policy Research Working Paper No. 4111, 2007); Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 501, 502 (1999).
16
See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility in
Health Reform, 14 Conn. Ins. L. J. 199 (2008).
17
See, e.g., Maxwell J. Mehlman, Wondergenes: Genetic Enhancement and the
Future of Society (Indiana University Press) 84-86 (2003); Ruth Fletcher et al., Legal
Embodiment: Analysing the Body of Healthcare Law, 16 Med. L. Rev. 321, 324-331 (2008).
18
See, e.g., Eleanor D. Kinney, Protecting American Health Care Consumers 910 (2002); Wendy K. Mariner, Standards of Care and Standard Form Contracts:
Distinguishing Patient Rights and Consumer Rights in Managed Care, 15 J. Contemp.
Health L. & Pol’y 1, 3-4 (1998).
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and laws across jurisdictional boundaries. It offers a common language for
communicating with scholars and lawyers in other countries. In today’s world,
health is a global issue, and laws affecting health reach across national
boundaries in many ways.19 For this reason alone, awareness of the treatment
of health in international covenants and documents may become an
important part of teaching and practice.
One need not have any interest in international or comparative law,
however, to recognize parallels between laws governing health and health care
in the United States and the conceptual framework for rights and obligations
used in international covenants.
The international language commonly used to discuss laws concerning
health and health care was inspired by the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights of the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC), in particular its authoritative interpretation of Article 12 of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR):
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to
the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental
health.”20 Article 12 sets forth a comprehensive, aspirational statement of
what has come to be called the international human right to health, itself
derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 21 The ECOSOC
Committee recognized that the “right to health is not to be understood as a

19
See Economic Policy Comm., European Comm’n, The Impact of Aging on
Public Expenditure: Projections for the EU25 Member States on Pensions, Health
Care, Long-Term Care, Education and Unemployment Transfers 2004-2050 5 (2006),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/epc/documents/2006/ageingreport_en.pdf; Obijiofor
Aginam, Global Health Governance: International Law and Public Health in a
Divided World 70 (2005); European Observatory on Health Sys. & Policies, Social
Health Insurance Systems in Western Europe 4 (Richard B. Saltman et al. eds., 2004),
http://www.euro.who.int/document/E84968.pdf.
20
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), Preamble, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966)
[hereinafter ICESCR], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm.
21
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess.,
1st plen.
Mtg.,
U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec.
12, 1948), available at
http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. The International Bill of Rights consists of The
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, id., the ICESCR, supra note 20, and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess.,
Supp. No. 16 (1966), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm. Article
25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “Everyone has the right to a
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other
lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” Other articles specify related rights
and the universality of all the rights described in the Declaration. For example, Article 1
states: “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” Article 2 states:
“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” Article 5 states: “No one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 9
states: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” Article 12 states: “No
one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.” The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, supra.
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right to be healthy,” something no one can guarantee.22 Rather, the
Committee describes steps that signatory States Parties are expected to take,
subject to their respective resources and other constraints on feasibility.
Although the Committee contemplates that each country will adopt legislation
or take other action to promote health, the precise nature of such actions
remains subject to interpretation and, in practice, they are implemented
differently and to varying degrees by each country.23
General Comment No. 14 makes clear that, like all human rights, “[t]he
right to health [in ICESCR Article 12] contains both freedoms and
entitlements.”24 States Parties must not interfere with personal freedoms, and
they must provide, to the extent feasible, the care and protection necessary to
protect the health of everyone in their populations. These obligations are
described as the duty to “respect, protect, and fulfill” the right to health:
(1) respect individual human rights and personal freedoms;
(2) protect people from harm from external sources or third parties; and
(3) fulfill the health needs of the population.25

International Health Framework

United States Health Laws

Respect

Individual Rights

•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Liberty
Privacy
Nondiscrimination

Liberty, informed consent
Privacy, confidentiality
Nondiscrimination
Access to emergency care

Protect

Health and Safety Regulation

•

•

•

Safety and quality standards
o
Food, medical products
o
Health professionals, facilities
o
Workplace and environment
Nondiscrimination
o
Access to care
o
Access to information

•
•

Health, safety and quality standards
o
Food, medical products
o
Health professionals, facilities
o
Workplace and environment
Insurance
Nondiscrimination
o
Access to care
o
Access to information
Marketing standards
o
Consumer disclosure
o
Antitrust
o
Anti-fraud, abuse

Fulfill

Service and Benefit Programs

•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Ensure provision of care
Ensure health living conditions
Promote research
Provide education
Promote education

Direct service programs
Financing benefits, services
Conduct, support research
Support public and professional education
Provide information

22
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural
Rights, Report on the Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third and Twenty-Fourth Sessions, Annex IV, ¶
8, U.N. Doc. E/2001/22-E/C.12/2000/21 (2001) [hereinafter General Comment].
23
Eleanor D. Kinney, The International Right to Health: What Does This Mean for Our
Nation and World?, 34 Ind. L. Rev. 1457, 1467 (2001).
24
General Comment, supra note 22.
25
Id. at Annex IV, ¶ 33.
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These three obligations provide an organizational structure for
categorizing laws affecting health in any country. The parallels between types
of law relevant to protecting individual rights, regulating private entities, and
government provision or financing of services are striking, at least to this
observer.26 The table above illustrates how laws affecting health in the United
States fall rather naturally into these categories. (The left hand column lists
illustrative topic areas within the categories of respect, protection and
fulfillment; the right hand column lists topics incorporated into Americans
laws.) If we think about this structure architecturally, the three categories
might represent three sections of the house, each with its particular
framework.
Virtually all federal, state and local laws defining the rights and duties of
private individuals and organizations, as well as those creating public
programs and benefits, can be classified according to one of the three
categories. Because the classification is based on the target of the law, some
subjects can overlap categories.27 For example, in the international
framework, prohibitions against certain forms of discrimination are found in
both the first and second categories: the State has an obligation not to
discriminate against individuals as part of its duty to respect the right to
health and a further obligation to ensure that third parties do not
discriminate as part of its duty to protect the right to health. This separation
has the advantage of distinguishing between laws that assign responsibility
directly to government and laws that impose obligations on private entities.
The duty to respect the right to health requires the State to “refrain from
interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to health.”28
This means that the State may not deny equal access to health services or
health information, or initiate or enforce discriminatory practices. It also
requires States to refrain from “applying coercive medical treatments,”
meaning that States must respect individuals’ freedom to choose the type of
care they receive and to refuse care they do not want.29 The duty of respect can
be best understood as a duty of noninterference with basic human rights like
liberty, privacy, dignity and freedom from arbitrary discrimination in the
health context, so that individuals are neither denied access to care nor
treated unfairly within any health setting. Indeed, it is generally believed to
confirm that such fundamental rights must be respected in the health context.
Such respect often takes the form of positive law protecting specific rights,

26
Wendy K. Mariner, Law and Public Health: Beyond Emergency Preparedness, 38 J.
Health L. 247, 250 (2005) (noting parallels); Wendy K. Mariner, Public Health and Law:
Past and Future Vision, 28 J. Health Pol., Pol’y & L. 525, 536-37 (2003) (same).
27
Comment 14 from the twenty-second session distinguishes the three obligations
primarily in terms of whether the State or third parties are providing or interfering with access
to health services. General Comment, supra note 22, Annex IV, at ¶ 33. For example,
Comment 14 mentions an obligation to refrain from marketing unsafe drugs as part of the duty
to respect the right to health and the similar duty to control the marketing of medical
equipment and medicines by third parties as part of the duty to protect the right to health,
thereby accounting for countries with either public or private systems. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 35.
28
Id. at ¶ 33.
29
Id. at ¶¶ 34, 35.
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such as the right to informed consent to medical care.30 In the United States,
the duty of respect can be seen in laws forbidding interference with individual
rights, such as laws requiring informed consent to medical care and research
and prohibiting invasions of privacy and discrimination in access to care.
The obligation to protect requires affirmative action to ensure that third
parties—essentially private entities – also do not interfere with the right to
health. Where private parties provide goods and services, the State is expected
regulate their activities by legislation, contract or other means. This includes
ensuring that health professionals meet appropriate quality and competence
standards, that food, medicines and health-related products are manufactured
and marketed safely, and that industry does not pollute the water, air or soil.31
It also requires legislation or other action to prevent third parties from
limiting access to care, such as family planning and pre- and post-natal care,
as well as accurate health information. It is important to note, however, that
the international framework does not prescribe any substantive or structural
requirements for positive law. Apart from the general notion that laws should
not imperil health or violate human rights, countries are free to develop many
different approaches to protecting health.
United States laws that set health and safety standards fall easily within
this category. They include professional and facility licensure laws, laws
setting environmental standards, safety and health standards for workplaces,
product standards and other laws intended to reduce health risks arising from
products or the social or working environment. This is a broad category
crossing a variety of legal fields, from administrative law to products liability.
It includes anything that prevents the conduct of business in a way that could
harm the health of patients, customers, workers or the general public.
Sanitary standards for conducting businesses that can harbor and spread
disease have existed since colonial times, applying to animal slaughtering
operations, mortuaries, and milk pasteurization, for example.32 More modern
examples include standards for clinical and research facilities, standards for
manufacturing food, drugs, medical devices and cosmetics, and even
inspecting restaurants. Laws requiring licensure of health professionals,
hospitals and other medical facilities are intended to ensure that those who
are granted the privilege of providing care have at least a minimal level of
competence and skill. Laws regulating health insurance set standards at least
believed to promote access to care and prevent certain forms of
discrimination. A huge number of national, state and local agencies, from the
federal Food and Drug Administration to the local septic system inspection
office, have been created to administer these regulatory systems.33 The
common law also provides standards intended to protect health, as found in
30
See
World
Health
Org.,
Patients’
Rights,
http://www.who.int/genomics/public/patientrights/en/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2009) (collection
of international and national documents on patient rights).
31
General Comment, supra note 22 at ¶¶ 35, 51. The General Comment also mentions
the obligation to refrain from marketing unsafe drugs and polluting the environment as part of
the duty to respect. See id. at ¶ 34.
32
See generally William J. Novak, The People’s Welfare: Law and Regulation in
Nineteenth-Century America 14-15 (1996).
33
See generally Kenneth R. Wing, The Law and the Public’s Health (6th ed.
2004).
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negligence law, products liability and even contract and insurance law
applicable to health insurance. This category might also include laws that
prohibit the sale of illicit drugs like heroin and marijuana, or the sale of
cigarettes and alcohol to minors, and laws that authorize the involuntary
detention of people who are likely to transmit contagious diseases to others
and people who are likely to harm others because of mental illness.
The obligation to fulfill requires countries to ensure that adequate health
care is provided to the entire population, whether by public or private
programs or a mixture of the two.34 Recognizing the social determinants of
health, it also requires that everyone have equal access to safe food and water,
basic sanitation, and adequate housing and living conditions. Ensuring care
also includes providing for appropriate training for medical professionals and
ensuring that a sufficient supply of hospitals and other health facilities
accessible is to everyone in the country. Assisting individuals to enjoy the right
to health includes fostering research and disseminating information to the
public. Satisfying these duties entails enacting legislation, adopting regulatory
measures or providing funding to develop affirmative programs.35 Here again,
however, there is no substantive requirement for any particular approach.
States may provide direct health services to all or some people in their
countries, require third parties such as employers or insurers to pay for care,
contract with third parties to offer care, or use a combination of approaches.
The duty to fulfill can be seen in American laws that affirmatively create
benefit programs – offering health care, services or information that
individuals are free to accept or refuse. This includes a vast array of public
programs to purify the water supply, organize disaster relief, provide medical
care such as Medicare and Medicaid as well as state programs for those
without health insurance, and fund public and private health programs like
family planning clinics, child nutrition programs, substance abuse treatment
centers, and refugee care facilities. It also includes public support for
biomedical research and public information programs. The number and type
of laws creating government programs in the fulfillment category has risen
dramatically since the mid-twentieth century.
Visualizing health laws as falling within these three categories has several
virtues. First, it pays needed attention to the relationship between human
health and respect for human rights.36 It embraces both the value of justice
and the value of health. The ICESCR recognizes, in Article 4, that in order to
protect people in the enjoyment of the right to health, some limits on
individual rights may be required, but “the State may subject such rights only
to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as this may be
compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”37 This is intended to
warn countries against using the right to health as a pretext for depriving
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people of other human rights.38 Any limitation on freedom must be justified
by its genuine contribution to preserving other freedoms and entitlements. In
this way, basic human rights provide a boundary constraint for the choices of
positive law that are permitted to protect health and fulfill health needs. This
constraint guards against allowing the value of health to override the rule of
law.
Another advantage of this framework is that it includes all aspects of the
health field: personal relationships, financial relationships, federal-state
jurisdiction, contractual relationships, rights and responsibilities, and
institutional structures. While health and healing may be the objectives of
people who provide medical care and those who finance and regulate those
services, there is much more to making health or healing possible. The range
of social and environmental factors that affect health are often as or more
important than medical care.39 The field of health continues to expand as
more is learned about what affects health, especially socioeconomic factors,
such as the distribution of income and wealth, political inequality, education,
employment, housing, and the environment (known as the social
determinants of health), as well as individual genetics, travel and migration,
and climate change.40 Laws governing those factors should not be ignored.41 If
institutional licensure and antitrust are included because they affect the way
health care is made available, occupational and environmental factors that
may affect health should be considered as well.42 They may solve problems
that seem intractable when viewed as medical or health care problems alone.
Adopting this broader vision is consistent with the history of health law,
which has developed and expanded in response to advances in science and
changes in the social institutions that affect health and medical care.
Finally, and most importantly, although the framework acknowledges the
relevance of many different factors affecting health, it does not prescribe any
particular legal structure or set of doctrines. The overall question is how to
organize social institutions (including rights and duties) to protect health and
treat illness without jeopardizing essential human rights like autonomy and
dignity. Answers to this question will necessarily embody normative values.
38

Id. at art. 5.
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Health Org., Final Report: Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health
Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health (2008),
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Kawachi et al., Income Inequality and Health: A Reader (1999); World Health Org.,
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(2004).
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But the framework does not answer the “how” question itself. Instead, it leaves
each country free to analyze the merits of specific choices for positive laws in
each category. It is here that more specific debates take place about the
justifiable objectives of particular laws and the merits of particular means to
achieve them, from employer mandates to compulsory immunization.
The international framework thus offers an architectural blueprint for
constructing health laws. Figure A, depicted at the end of this article, offers a
rough illustration. The obligation to respect can be seen as the foundation for
two more stories, one protecting and the other fulfilling health needs. Laws
protecting basic human rights, such as autonomy and privacy, frame the
structure, creating boundary constraints as well as structural beams
projecting through all the floors. Within each story are multiple rooms,
furnished with relevant legal domains overlaying topic areas, as illustrated at
the end of this article in Figure B. Debates over particular laws contribute to
the discussion of how to furnish the rooms. Should government provide
particular services directly, fund private entities to do so, require private
organizations to provide services, or adopt some or all of these options? Which
legal principles should govern? A few antiques may fit some rooms perfectly,
while new pieces may be required in others. Some bits of furniture may need
reupholstering to suit the room. The iterative process of adapting doctrine to
suit the circumstances continues here.
This vision of health law is less eccentric than the house of Edgewood,
with its idiosyncratic, mismatched sections. The international framework
offers an integrated, external architecture for housing the field of health law.
In contrast to Edgewood, health law’s idiosyncrasies are inside, in the rich
variation of its interior spaces. There is even room for considering
international and comparative law. Importantly, by consolidating all types of
law that affect health, it reminds us that there are many ways to solve health
problems and that we should consider all the alternatives before automatically
adopting a particular approach.
III. WHAT IS A FIELD OF LAW ANYWAY?
The foregoing description explicitly recognizes, as do most observers, that
health law is an applied field.43 To many, this confers an advantage and a rich
opportunity to consolidate legal education in a way that mirrors actual
practice.44 Some academic traditionalists, however, would not count an
applied field as a “field of law.”45 This begs the question of why other generally
accepted areas of study or practice should qualify as fields of law. By what
standards and criteria, and for what purpose, is any particular area thought to
qualify as a substantive field?46 This question turns out to be quite difficult to
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answer. The literature is notable for the absence of an epistemology or meta
theory for positively defining the essential characteristics of a “field of law.”47
One possible answer, which may be the most accurate, is that separate
fields have become accepted as a matter of historical accident or practical
need. If longevity counts, one might take note that Blackstone’s Commentaries
includes a chapter entitled “Of Offences Against the Public Health, and the
Public Police or Economy,” dealing primarily with plague.48 Treatises on
medical jurisprudence also date from the 19th century,49 including works by
John Ordronaux, who taught on the law faculties of Boston University and
Columbia University.50
It might be argued that a field cannot be defined simply by the subject
matter to which it applies. And yet many are defined in that manner, and they
have ample precedent. Nineteenth century legal scholarship includes treatises
on the law of highways,51 the law of railways,52 the law of telegraphs,53 and the
law of building associations, which may be an ancestor of banking and mutual
insurance law.54
Legal texts summarizing the law in 18th and 19th century America contain
somewhat different lists of fields of law (sometimes called subjects or
47
Authors describe particular fields in different terms, often without specifying
independent criteria. See, e.g., W. Cole Durham Jr., Revivifying the Field of Law and Religion,
57 Emory L. J. 1411, 1411 (2008); Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and
Jurisprudence in the 21st Century, 36 Rutgers L. J. 165, 165 (2004) (taking “stock of the field
of law and philosophy”); Lessig, supra note 15, at 502; Jacqueline Lipton, A Framework for
Information Law and Policy, 82 Or. L. Rev. 695, 700 (2003) (arguing for a new field of
“information law” that focuses on information, in contrast to cyberlaw, which the author
argues focuses instead on the technology).
48
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161 (London, A. Strahan for T. Cadell and W. Davies 1803). See also Thomas F. Gordon, A
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(including the chapter “Of Quarantines and Health Laws”). See generally Bertram Jacobs, A
Manual of Public Health Law (1912); LeRoy Parker & Robert H. Worthington, The
Law of Public Health and Safety (Albany, M. Bender 1892).
49
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Nineteenth Century America (1993); John Ordronaux, Jurisprudence of Medicine in
its Relation to the Law of Contracts, Torts, and Evidence (Philadelphia, T. & J.W.
Johnson 1869); Isaac Ray, A Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1838). See also Sandbar, supra note 2, at 2 (briefly describing
the history of medical jurisprudence in the United States).
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Law of Contracts, Torts, and Evidence (The Lawbook Exch., Ltd. 2006) (1869). See also
Obituary Notes, January 21, 1908, N. Y. Times, http://query.nytimes.com/mem/
archive-free/pdf?_r=1&res=9E0DE0DD113EE033A25752C2A9679C946997D6CF (detailing
Ordronaux’s teaching career at Columbia, Dartmouth, University of Vermont, and Boston
University).
51
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(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1857).
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Little, Brown, & Co. 1858) (Chief Justice of Vermont).
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divisions) than their later counterparts. Nonetheless, many are described by
the subjects to which the law described applies.
In his 1868 text summarizing law, Joel Prentiss Bishop remarked, “the
first thing to be noticed is, that the subjects run into and include one
another.”55 For example, the law of evidence, although a recognized division in
the law, pertained to the law of contracts, real property, personal property,
torts, public wrongs, international public and private law, “and all the rest.”56
Bishop argued that discussions “aimed at ascertaining what is the true
scientific division of the legal field . . . are like the endeavors to find the
philosopher’s stone, to square the circle . . . endeavors after what, in the nature
of things, cannot be performed, because the thing itself does not exist.”57
Many accepted fields of law exhibited blurred boundaries. Separate areas,
such as the law of easements, the law of mortgages, the law of executory
devises, and the law of estates eventually coalesced into the more general law
of real property, while also touching on the law of contracts.58 Each area has a
feathering edge where overlap is inevitable. Prosser might have expressed the
difficulty of setting firm boundaries when he wrote: “tort is a field which
pervades the entire law, and is so interlocked at every point with property,
contract and other accepted classifications that . . . the categories are quite
arbitrary and there is no virtue in them.”59 Yet, Prosser also developed a
separate field of agency.60 Legal fields arise and fade away, expand and
contract according to the problems and possibilities of contemporary society
and commerce. So, the law of bills and notes has been overtaken by
commercial transactions, which itself can be viewed as an aspect of contracts.
This phenomenon of running together yet remaining apart continues
today. Compare the curriculum of almost any law school in 1950 with today’s
curriculum. Only a small proportion of subjects remain the same in name and
content. Family law, for example, has absorbed the older law of marriage, with
its reliance on distinctions between public and private spheres of
responsibility, yet also feathers into principles of contract, tort, wills and
trusts. Property law has borrowed from real and personal property. Subjects
that today seem commonplace, like securities law and insurance law, would
have surprised our ancestors, while others to which they paid studious
attention, like admiralty, restitution, or maritime law, have a narrower
audience. New fields arise and gain acceptance despite their initial
strangeness. In 1868, Bishop encouraged his readers to study the U.S.
Constitution because, “Here is a new field.”
Some areas acquire their distinctiveness, despite belonging to a larger
conceptual sphere. Intellectual property has carved out a specialty area within
property law. But for practical experience, antitrust law might be an aspect of
contracts. For that matter, many fields of law might be brought under the
55
Joel Prentiss Bishop, The First Book of the Law; Explaining the Nature,
Sources, Books, and Practical Applications of Legal Science, and Methods of Study
and Practice. § 321, at 219 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1868).
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Id. at 234.
57
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umbrella of contracts. If we were to collapse all the categories of law that
belong to contracts and torts, we would have two vast fields indeed. Yet that
might only inspire continuing the subdivisions as subspecialties of contracts,
with little substantive change in current teaching or practice.61
Bishop’s refreshingly honest appraisal of the difficulty of separating one
field from another did not dissuade him from recognizing divisions: “Still, as a
matter of practical convenience, we may divide off the legal field in various
ways, as may best suit the particular purpose of the division, or our tastes.”62 It
thus appears that the division of legal principles into fields of law remains a
function of the purpose for which division is useful. Or perhaps it’s just a
matter of taste.
Most treatises describing fields of law make no effort to define fields
according to any independent criteria. Nonetheless, one can discern three
possible approaches to defining a discrete field. The first is by subject matter,
taking the history and tradition of rules and customs associated with a
particular subject, like maritime trade and the sea.63 The second centers on a
statute or set of related documents.64 A growing number of fields fall into this
second category, including trademark, administrative, bankruptcy, tax, and
environmental law, as well as constitutional law and international public law.
The third, and apparently smallest category, is defined by the overall purpose
of the laws associated with the field. Here, contract law may be the best
example. As defined in Corbin’s treatise, the purpose of contract law is “the
realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the making
of a promise.”65 One might expect that a similar purpose could be stated for
other traditional and enduring fields, but legal goals are not easily found or
stated.66
Fields of law appear to have grown up according to quite different
principles of organization, principles that are neither mutually exclusive nor
internally consistent. While some gather a variety of legal principles around a
focal subject, others concentrate on a document that inspires interpretation.
Some, like conflicts and evidence, seem more procedural than substantive.
Surprisingly few are grounded in goals, conceptual principles or themes
independent of the subject matter to which they apply. These may include
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conflict of laws, contracts, criminal law, property, and torts, although property
and torts admittedly feather out into the cornucopia of other legal fields, too.
The lesson here is that no ultimate authority exists for defining a field of
law. Defining a field by the subject matter around which legal principles are
gathered has as credible a pedigree as any other approach. Complaints that
“law and …” fields are necessarily illegitimate overstate the case. In the
absence of any compelling argument for adherence to rigid boundaries, a field
may be defined by its own practitioners for their purposes or tastes. The test
of its validity lies in whether others accept it.
IV. ACCEPTING HEALTH LAW
The world of practicing lawyers has definitely accepted health law as a
specialty. The public and private programs, activities, and businesses that
finance, provide, and oversee health care account for more than 16 percent of
the country’s gross domestic product.67 Expertise in laws governing the health
sector is taken seriously for that reason alone. Today’s law students are
increasingly likely to encounter health law issues in their careers and certainly
in their personal lives. The practice of law now includes substantial segments
devoted to health-related issues. Moreover, the organizational structure of the
practice of law has changed.68 Larger firms offer specialty groups within a
national general practice. The number of federal, state and local agencies
involved with health-related issues increased dramatically in late 20th century,
and lawyers have been welcomed at those agencies, as well as at hospitals,
pharmaceutical companies, and advocacy organizations, to name only a few.
Whatever one might think of the appropriate roles of graduate education and
professional training, law schools need to train students for these careers.69
Furthermore, those who teach health law must define their subject, if only to
decide what to teach.70 Students also need to know the general boundaries of
the terrain to be covered.71
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With so many lawyers teaching and practicing what they call health law, it
is hard to assert that no such field exists.72 Defining it more elegantly and
succinctly than I have tried to do in Part III above is both appealing and
challenging.73 Definitions tend to fall into two general categories: (1)
definitions or descriptions based on topics or policy goals;74 and (2) normative
theories about the goals of health law in whole or in part.75 Textbooks for
teaching and practical treatises and manuals often use the first category,
dividing the subject matter into subcategories familiar to practicing lawyers:
subjects, such as liability, financing, corporate regulation, and bioethics; and
policy goals, such as quality, cost, access, and autonomy. Alternatively, they
divide it into structural components, such as international, governmental,
institutional, and individual.
The topic-oriented approach has left some observers hungry for common
legal themes to unite the components into more than a collection of healthrelated problems.76 Some academics wish to endow the field with the higher
credibility that law faculties accord to scholarship addressing legal theory.77
The more ambitious souls have offered ideas toward constructing a theory of
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health law,78 efforts that have been regarded variously with enthusiasm and
bemusement within the academy.79 Given that law review articles are largely
ignored outside the academy,80 the audience for legal theory scholarship is
limited. Where tenure standards favor theory over utility, however, junior
faculty may have to find some strands of theory or at least doctrinal
convergence in their topics. So faculty continue to look for the thematic
threads that tie disparate health law issues together, much as scholars stitched
together earlier groupings to posit a “law” of intellectual property or family
law.81 Normative theories respond to this aspiration.
Normative theories have focused on professional values,82 economics,83
and social goals, regulatory authority, and public expectations.84 These may be
seen as values that do or should influence legal doctrine applicable to
problems in the health field or as goals for the law to achieve.
The special relationship between physicians and patients was a defining
feature of medicine and law in its early days.85 Both the values of the medical
profession and its tradition of self-regulation offered a measure of
distinctiveness to justify special rules for physicians and patients.86 Today,
however, professional self-regulation has been diminished – and tarnished87 –
so substantially that it no longer serves as a field-defining attribute.88
Furthermore, professional self-regulation begs the question of whether the
medical profession can be distinguished from the legal profession or any other
for the purpose of crafting unique legal rights or responsibilities. More
fundamentally, the very concept of profession has undergone intense
questioning about whether it is possible to distinguish professions from other
78
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commercial endeavors, and therefore whether professionals should be
accorded different legal treatment by virtue of their calling alone.89
Law and medicine, not to mention the care delivery and financing
institutions, have evolved so significantly that professionalism alone cannot
offer thematic consistency across the entire range of issues within health law.
The rise of hospitals and other health facilities, health insurance, and
government agencies to regulate facilities, research, pharmaceuticals, and
everything in between encouraged viewing the field as an industry amenable
to economic analysis. Academic and perhaps political disagreements over law
and economics approaches can tag the debate with a tinge of partisanship.
These conceptions of health law offer important perspectives on particular
legal principles, but most seem too broad or too narrow, too subject-driven or
too value-laden, to constitute an overarching normative goal for the field as a
whole. They also carry the risk of legal instrumentalism – forcing law to
achieve the goals of non-legal fields, like banking, insurance, or medicine.90
Law can sometimes be a means to an end, but law has its own ends which
should never be forfeited.91
For the most part, normative theories compete to resolve more specific
issues within a field.92 In this role, they sometimes reflect philosophical
preferences for specific outcomes. It may be too much to expect any normative
theory to embrace an entire field objectively. Certainly, no single theory has
proved generally acceptable. This suggests that descriptions of the field should
avoid normative stances.
Normative theories about health law have other disadvantages as a
conceptual framework for a legal domain. Most normative theories limit their
scope to medical care, typically excluding mental health, environmental
health, public health, and social, economic and political conditions. Even
thoughtful examinations that seek common themes across the spectrum of
norms largely limit themselves to medical care and its financing.93 Narrowing
may be a practical necessity when organizing law school courses, but it fails to
capture the growing interconnectedness of health issues today.
Mark Hall notes that one might regard health law “as an intellectual field
defined more by method than by substance – that method being some version
of comparative institutional analysis.”94 But, as he also correctly recognizes,
comparing different theoretical approaches to analyzing an issue is a

89
Compare, P. Sieghart, Professions as the Conscience of Society, 11 J. Med. Ethics 117,
117-20 (1985) (positing that the rule of conduct in professional ethics is “the service of a noble
cause,” which differentiates true professions from other trades or occupations) with R. S.
Downie, Professional Ethics, 12 J. Med. Ethics 64, 64 (1986) (challenging Sieghart’s
arguments and considering that “there is nothing to distinguish the professional from other
occupations in terms of the criteria of self-interest and altruism.”).
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technique used in most legal domains.95 Not being unique to health law,
analysis cannot serve as a basis for distinguishing it from other fields. Nan
Hunter proposes “risk governance” as a theoretical paradigm applicable to
insurance and risk in medical care.96 This approach has the value of
recognizing law’s central function as a risk allocation device. Yet because risk
allocation it also a generic concept that pervades most legal fields – think of
criminal law – it may serve best as a lens through which to view specific
principles and doctrines, rather than as a defining attribute of health law.
These approaches have enriched our thinking about health law issues, but
have not generated consensus. No single methodological approach,
perspective or normative paradigm seems capable of encompassing the range
of legal issues in the health field. They are best suited to interpreting
principles and adapting doctrines and rules. Normative theories give us fresh
perspectives on how to choose the right rule, for example whether direct
government intervention or a standard for private entities to obey. In health
law’s architecture, they can direct us to one floor or another and guide how we
design and furnish each room. They belong inside the house of health law, but
they are too specific to construct its entire framework. In any event, there does
not appear to be any satisfactory reason for making a normative theory a
prerequisite to recognizing a field of law.
V. CONCLUSION
Health law is an eclectic and integrated translegal field, drawing on
multiple domains of law to create an identifiable applied field of law. It
applies and adapts existing law to protect health within the constraints of
justice and human rights. Accomplishing this requires identifying all laws that
affect health and evaluating their capacity to improve health without violating
or impairing human rights. The international health framework provides a
valuable, functional description of the health law field, because it
encompasses virtually all the institutional and private structures and
relationships needed to attend to people’s health, as well as the range of legal
doctrines available to address health concerns. The international health
framework recognizes both the singular value of health to human beings and
the impossibility of protecting, preserving or restoring health without legally
sanctioned social institutions that respect human rights. It also encourages
reflection on both the substantive and procedural contours of laws that might
address health problems. It accomplishes this without imposing more specific
normative goals on law itself. Viewing health law as a structure for making
health the subject of law will, I hope, encourage continued examination and
debate over the field’s interior spaces.
At Edgewood, the house that Drinkwater built was home to generations of
a family whose members exhibited beliefs in tradition, progress, literacy,
laziness, nurturance, nonsense, and the occasional communion with faeries.
95
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Today’s house of health law accommodates an equally eclectic collection of
scholars and practicing lawyers and promises many generations to come. Yet,
unlike Edgewood, our home has changed, growing much larger and creating
an increasingly cohesive external architecture from the values of justice and
health. Inside, many different styles are still welcome.

Figure A.
Architectural Structure for Health Law
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